muslim-brotherhood-syria

Muslim Brotherhood in Syria

Over the past seventy-five years, the Muslim Brotherhood has established itself as a significant Islamic movement, adeptly navigating the shifting political landscape of the Middle East. Similar to their Egyptian counterparts, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has cultivated a strong network of dedicated members throughout the region, at times cooperating with and at other times opposing the Syrian regime. Initially, the organization embraced “Islamic Socialism” to align with the early political realities in Syria, but it later shifted its stance to directly challenge socialism and secularism. Portions of the group evolved into militant factions committed to establishing an Islamic state. Since 2010, as protests in Syria escalated into a full-blown civil war, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has found itself at a crossroads. It has been overshadowed by other militant groups actively engaged in the conflict, such as the al-Qaeda-aligned Al-Nusra Front, and has seen its influence wane since its peak in the 1980s, largely due to a devastating government crackdown in Homs that led to widespread destruction and expulsion of its members. However, much like the swift changes in fortune experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood now has an opportunity to leverage its political influence to mobilize supporters and potentially solidify its role in a post-civil war Syria. They will undoubtedly analyze the lessons learned from assuming power too early to avoid the significant challenges currently faced by Morsi and the Egyptian Brotherhood. Likely, they will wait until they can rebuild their network of alliances and party members outside the spotlight of leadership, following the conclusion of the civil war.

History of the General Muslim Brotherhood

The foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood was deeply rooted in the personality of Hassan al-Banna. By the age of 13 in 1919, al-Banna was already leading religious and social institutions in his hometown of Ismailia, Egypt, influenced by Sufi aesthetics and activism. After attending Dar al-‘Ulum in Cairo, he vowed to become a teacher, aiming to inspire a new generation of Egyptians committed to sound education within an Islamic framework. He soon found himself delivering sermons in crowded cafes, reaching an older generation eager to rekindle their religious fervor. Some nights, al-Banna taught full courtyards of a thousand people, guiding his followers through passages of the Quran and the forgotten art of ablution before prayer. He consistently emphasized the importance of a compassionate Islamic expansion rooted in community and shared sacrifice, traveling across the country to establish Muslim Brotherhood offices. During this period, the region was experiencing a tumultuous era, grappling with the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the subsequent dissolution of the Caliphate in 1924. The shift from the Arabic alphabet to Turkish and the growing British influence in Egypt further complicated matters. Egypt itself was navigating an imperial presence while strategizing how to reclaim a semblance of independence, seeking to fill the cultural void left by the Ottomans. Al-Banna was a social Islamist and passionate nationalist, deeply engaged with the dynamic regional landscape. Although the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) would later play a pivotal role in shaping modern political Islam, he hesitated to enter the political arena until the latter part of his career. It was during the final stages of the MB's formation, in response to oppression from authorities, that the organization began to develop its political advocacy, demonstrating a willingness to both challenge and collaborate with state administrations.

Spread of MB Philosophy through the Region

The MB's message resonated throughout the small villages and towns of Egypt and even reached beyond its borders, despite al-Banna's nationalistic rhetoric. By the early 1940s, the MB was actively engaged in the Palestinian issue and began addressing broader regional concerns under a pseudo-Pan-Islamism framework, emphasizing the unity of the Islamic community alongside nationalism and Arabism. However, the MB discovered that allowing each community to adapt the overarching Islamic ideology to their specific circumstances fostered a diverse array of grassroots organizations. These groups could effectively focus on their unique challenges while remaining committed to certain core principles. The Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups spreading across Palestine and parts of Jordan adopted an anti-Zionist stance, while those in Iraq and Syria emphasized socialism and secularism. In Northern Africa, the focus shifted to urbanization and environmental challenges. This diverse approach, which allowed various groups to tackle local issues rather than imposing a uniform strategy, enabled the Brotherhood to thrive and expand throughout the region. It is credited with revitalizing religious activism that had previously waned due to apathy. In the Fertile Crescent, numerous MB-aligned groups exist, and each state has adopted different policies toward them, ranging from assassination and oppression to acceptance and cooperation. Initially welcomed in Syria for their pro-socialist views and support of the government, the Brotherhood soon altered their tactics in response to increasing government repression, meeting violence with violence. Jordan, under a religious monarchy, became a refuge for many MB members fleeing the conflict in Syria, allowing them to regroup and plan their return. In 1985, King Hussein ultimately apologized to Hafez al-Assad for harboring the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, Lebanon has had to contend with the presence of Hezbollah, a Shi’a rival of the Brotherhood, while countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman have accused the MB of aligning with al-Qaeda elements and inciting foreign-led protests. Hamas, a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has made militancy and resistance to Israel central to its platform, which starkly contrasts with the Egyptian Brotherhood's stated goal of gradual Islamization through social pressure. These groups exemplify the diverse outcomes that have emerged from Hassan al-Banna’s original movement and illustrate how Islamic activism adapts to its social and political context, resulting in a spectrum of organizations that range from peaceful reform to the violent overthrow of established institutions.

Role of the Egyptian MB in Shaping Policy in Outlying Groups

It's crucial to differentiate between the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement and as a political entity. Hassan al-Banna envisioned Islamic activism as a constructive force in society, one that should be integrated into individual lives with the support of the community, rather than imposed from above through a rigid enforcement of sharia law on those who are unwilling. Scholar Ishak Husaini, in his analysis of the Brotherhood’s principles, highlights the implicit avoidance of political parties: “The mission of Islam is generic, gathering together, not rendering asunder, and no one can further the mission nor work for it unless he is devoid of all partiality and has become purely devoted to God.”[^5] It wasn't until 1947 that al-Banna engaged directly with politics, reaching out to Egypt’s King Farouq, Mustafa al-Nahaas Pasha, and other leaders in the Islamic world to demonstrate how religion and the Brotherhood were shaping communities. “During this time, the Brethren emphasized productive action, virtuous education, and effective organization rather than useless propaganda.”[^6] Al-Banna firmly believed that intertwining the positive aspects of religion with the more destructive elements of politics would undermine the potential for both to thrive. While he laid the foundation of the movement and served as its inspiration, he later faced challenges from figures like Sayyed Qutb, who sought to promote a more radical interpretation of Islam in both society and politics. The generation that followed al-Banna established parties that, while theoretically independent, were fundamentally driven by the core ideology of creating Islamic communities. These political parties could advocate for specific platforms to address local or regional needs, all while safeguarding the essential principles of the ikhwan from the corrupting influence of politics.

Syrian Brotherhood History

Similar to the emergence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mustafa al-Sibai played a pivotal role in the foundation of Islamic revival in Syria under the Brotherhood's ideology. His father, a scholar, ensured that his education included not only the memorization of the Quran and a focus on Arabic but also, crucially, the art of public speaking. According to his biography, al-Sibai's father took him to numerous intellectual gatherings, where he honed his skills in persuasion and debate. After France took control of Syria in 1920, following its colonization of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, al-Sibai was outraged by what he perceived as the ongoing destruction of the Arab and Muslim world. This indignation fueled his activism. At just 16 years old, he was arrested by the French, but his imprisonment sparked a series of protests against imperialism that ultimately led to his release and a sustained wave of resistance in his hometown of Homs. After leaving Syria, Sibai relocated to Egypt, where he graduated from al-Azhar, impressing al-Banna with his innate talent for Islamic mobilization. He was arrested once more, this time by the British, for advocating Egyptian independence. Following his arrest, he was sent back to France and subsequently imprisoned for two and a half years after engaging in combat against French forces. Like al-Banna, he was a teacher who successfully expanded the ikhwan influence among the younger generation, instilling a deep sense of religiosity alongside general studies. He founded the school Al-Ma`ahad al-Arabi al-Islami, which gained popularity throughout Syria for its national curriculum that emphasized piety, morality, and Islam. Al-Sibai played a pivotal role in establishing the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, but it’s important to recognize the significant exchange of ideas and individuals between Syria and Egypt. Faced with threats from French forces, many young men fled to Egypt, where they pursued their studies at institutions like al-Azhar and Dar-al-‘Ulum, returning to Syria equipped with a broad spectrum of Islamic and Brotherhood ideology. This exchange explains the close ties between the two movements. Husaini notes that the Egyptian Brotherhood took special care to educate, support, and nurture foreign students who came to Egypt for their Islamic education, viewing each as a potential future member of the movement. Syria became the first foreign branch of the Brotherhood, and the Egyptian MB regarded it as an ideal counterbalance to an overly centralized administration. When repression against Brotherhood members intensified in Syria, they would often relocate to Egypt, and vice versa. The connection was so strong that after the assassination of al-Banna and the seizure of Brotherhood property, serious consideration was given to relocating the headquarters to Damascus and then Aleppo. Although this move never officially occurred, the bond between the two movements remained stronger than any other inter-branch relationships, allowing them to collaborate effectively, despite some ideological differences shaped by their respective national contexts.

Muslim Brotherhood Relations with the Syrian Government, French, and British

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was officially established in 1945, although a de facto branch had already emerged in 1937, consisting of al-Azhar-educated members fostered by the Egyptian Brotherhood in Damascus. Over the years, the Syrian MB steadily expanded its base of followers across the country. Al-Sibai, who was appointed President of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood for life, cultivated a close relationship with al-Banna and largely aligned with the Brotherhood's general ideology, albeit with some notable differences. Like their Egyptian counterparts, the Syrian MB faced a tension between their ideals of non-violence, pluralism, and social activism, and the necessary measures to effectively oppose colonialism. While the Egyptian MB fought for independence from British rule, the Syrian MB focused on resisting the French and actively participated in various movements aimed at achieving Syrian independence. During their 1943 council, they established paramilitary organizations, such as Saraya and Futuwa, referred to as phalanx, to counter the French presence. By 1945, these units were fully trained and ready to join the resistance. The Syrian branch directly engaged in armed resistance against the French, collaborating with other groups involved in the struggle, which was a crucial aspect of their commitment to pluralism and national unity. Following the French retreat in 1946, the Syrian MB shifted its focus to Palestine, with al-Sibai himself leading a group of phalanx fighters against British forces and Zionism. By the early 1950s, the Brotherhood had earned a reputation for its strong resistance against imperialism and garnered respect for the sacrifices made in the pursuit of Syrian independence. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) continued to emphasize Islamic social outreach to strengthen their base, promoting an MB-inspired educational system throughout the countryside, alongside medical outreach, community education, and support for the underprivileged. Unlike their Egyptian counterparts, the Syrian MB permitted members to contest elections and build their political presence, although this would not become a significant factor until the 1960s, with the rise of the Baath Party and the ensuing dynamics between the two groups.

Syrian Brotherhood Persecution/Role as Opposition

The Syrian MB established its reputation by resisting French colonial rule, yet faced crucial decisions about the future of their movement as their primary focus became less relevant. Unlike Egypt, Syria was not predominantly Sunni Muslim; it was home to a diverse array of minorities, including Shi’ites, Druze, Christians, and various Islamic sects. Furthermore, Syria had not traditionally embraced religious fundamentalism nor concentrated solely on prevailing regional themes, such as opposition to Zionism or Arab unity. Aware of this complexity, the Syrian MB was careful not to explicitly state their goal of establishing an Islamic nation, as doing so could alienate many of their allied groups. In their 1937 proclamation, which preceded the officially recognized MB in 1945, they made no mention of a religious government. Instead, they called for “the reform of the regulations, laws, and courts to ensure justice among the people.” While they referenced religion in a general sense, their true aim was “to explain the mission of the Quran—the constitution of the Arabs and Muslims—presenting it in a manner suitable to the times and demonstrating it to the people as the most compelling and comprehensive of missions.”

Relations with the Baath Party

Throughout the 1940s and '50s, the Syrian MB maintained a moderate, pluralistic stance, engaging with their fellow Syrians with a focus on unity rather than Islamic dominance. Unlike the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian branch did not reject the idea of political parties and even allied with groups that held opposing ideologies. In fact, several members of the Syrian Brotherhood who ran for parliamentary seats were labeled “leftist” by other organizations, further widening the ideological rift between them and their Egyptian counterparts. Amid the chaos of Syrian politics, the Brotherhood managed to maintain their social operations, as military coups, revolts, and conflicts with Israel created uncertainty within the upper echelons of Syrian leadership. One significant outcome of these coups was the military's growing power and support, which became crucial for maintaining stability in the country. This shift had dire consequences for the popular, yet largely non-military, Syrian Brotherhood. The political turmoil, coupled with a deteriorating economic situation, prompted Syria to explore a variety of new ideologies, including Syrian Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, Socialism, Communism, and Pan-Islamism. Seemingly minor events, such as General Zaim’s speech criticizing traditional Arab headgear, nudged segments of Syrian society toward westernization, while rural and poorer communities were left behind in the social hierarchy. The 1956 Suez Crisis in Egypt catalyzed Syria's pivot toward the Soviet Union. Although they did not fully embrace Soviet-style communism, Syrian leaders—including a succession of military coup leaders—began to believe that socialism could effectively address the growing inequities within society. The founders of the Baath Party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, immersed themselves in a diverse array of European philosophies and ideologies, blending these influences with a vision of Arab unity. Following a series of coups and uprisings, the Syrian Baath Party officially seized power, championing a socialist agenda bolstered by military support and a weakened parliamentary system rife with fragmented parties. This consolidation of power under a unified vision forced the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to confront a pivotal choice: to support, cooperate with, or resist the emerging Baathist regime. Their historical role in combating the French and their acceptance of a socialism infused with Islamic principles positioned them to leverage political advancements. However, the composition of the new leadership ensured that the MB would find itself at odds with the regime's staunch secularism. In the early years of Baathist rule, the slogan "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" initially embodied a moderate form of socialism that was not the primary focus. Yet, the Baath's merger with the Arab Socialist Party in 1952 shifted socialism to a central role within the state, contrasting sharply with the Syrian MB’s viewpoint, which emphasized local community engagement. Heightening tensions, a Syrian army magazine published an article asserting that Syria must eradicate "backward ideologies" such as feudalism, capitalism, colonialism, God, and religion, further underscoring the military's influence in shaping Syrian society and its priorities. As the Baathists grew increasingly authoritarian, a direct correlation emerged between their escalating repression and the intensity of the MB's criticism and violent resistance against the regime. During the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was actively shaping a religious order within the nation, targeting both urban professionals and rural communities. However, they faced competition from the Ba’athists and communists, who were also courting these groups. In response, Sibai reasserted his socialist credentials and established the Islamic Socialist Front in 1949. Yet, when the Ba’athists seized power in 1963, their socialist initiatives alienated much of the urban middle class, disenfranchising a broad spectrum of society and shifting the center of opposition to the cities, along with the MB’s recruitment efforts. By 1964, just a year after the Ba’athist Military Committee took control, the MB allied with merchants and led significant uprisings in Hama and Damascus. They barricaded streets, attacked government buildings and officials, and utilized mosques to rally citizens to their cause. The MB managed to evade much of the criticism directed at secular conservatives, who were accused of exploiting worker injustices, by emphasizing their commitment to social activism. This strategy positioned the MB as the de facto leader of the opposition, a coalition that included individuals from all segments of society, many of whom were non-religious. In the early 1960s, the MB removed any mention of socialism from their platform, signaling a shift in their ideology. While they criticized Western capitalism as the root of materialism, they viewed socialism as a form of redistributive tyranny that threatened freedom. Their criticism of the regime intensified, with the primary objective of the movement becoming the removal of the Ba’ath regime. The sixties marked a period of growth and resurgence for the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), but they also saw an escalation in clashes with the government and Ba’athist militants, particularly in regions like Hama and Damascus. The government gained notoriety for using artillery and shells to obliterate the most vocal mosques, leading to a deepening divide that ultimately resulted in full polarization across Syria. In a dramatic shift in resistance against the regime, the MB—possibly inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979—executed a series of violent actions: the massacre of fifty military students in Aleppo during the summer of 1979, the seizure of numerous towns in Northern Syria, which erupted into open warfare against government targets, and an assassination attempt on Assad in 1980. Assad's response was both unexpected and overwhelmingly brutal, highlighting the dangerous intersection of political power and military might. Amnesty International estimates that the regime's reprisals, including full-scale artillery barrages, resulted in the deaths of up to 25,000 people, while other sources suggest that the true toll may have been significantly higher due to subsequent violence and separate incidents. Thousands of ikhwan lost their lives in the fighting, while many more were arrested, expelled, or fled to neighboring territories. Assad's violent crackdown effectively dismantled the MB's presence in Syria. In the wake of this turmoil, the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria emerged—a new coalition of opposition groups united in their goal to overthrow Assad. This alliance maintained an element of resistance under an Islamic banner but welcomed any organization or individual that was not “anti-Islamic,” thereby ensuring a broad base of support. Meanwhile, the Brothers themselves were relegated to a diminished role in the aftermath of the Homs reprisals, primarily operating from exile in Egypt and Jordan, as the Ba’athist government increasingly leaned on Iran, bringing larger forces into play. Israel’s 1982 raid into Lebanon, along with significant peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and the power struggles between Syria and Iraq, compelled Syria to operate on a broader regional scale, diverting attention from domestic issues. While outright political opposition and resistance to the Ba’athists persisted, it existed at a much lower intensity than before. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, though still holding pockets of support, has struggled to regain its former strength in recent years. However, with the political leadership vacuum created by the Syrian civil war, it has found new hope for reestablishing its influence.

Emergence of Civil War

In March 2011, protests erupted across Syria, aligning with what would later be known as the “Arab Spring.” While Egypt, Tunisia, and eventually Libya succeeded in deposing their leaders, the Syrian conflict escalated into a full-blown civil war. Unlike in Egypt, the Syrian army remained firmly loyal to Bashar al-Assad, as many generals had strong familial ties to the Alawite community. The army's deployment throughout the country to suppress the uprising led to a dramatic escalation of violence. By 2012, the situation had deteriorated into outright civil war, characterized by urban and guerrilla warfare, along with artillery and airstrike reprisals, which accounted for the staggering number of casualties. Foreign fighters, including many veterans of the Iraq War, have joined the conflict, bolstered by direct support from Iran and Hezbollah Shi’ites. Assad has few allies in the international community, aside from Russia, while the opposition has increasingly adopted an Islamist character, raising concerns among Western nations and other Middle Eastern countries about a potential Sunni-Shi’a conflict and escalating sectarian strife. As for which side will ultimately prevail, the answer remains uncertain. Throughout 2012, the opposition made significant gains, capturing large portions of Syria, but the government has effectively countered these advances, regaining territory on a daily basis. As of early June 2013, it has launched operation “Northern Storm” in collaboration with Hezbollah and Shabiha militias to reclaim areas surrounding Aleppo. The opposition has shown little interest in negotiating a peace deal that would allow the current government to remain in power, and the Free Syrian Army has struggled to form a cohesive front with a unified set of goals. Even if Assad manages to prevail in this conflict, there is little hope that he can govern the country with any level of acceptable or sustainable support. Although Shi’ias and other minorities support the government, Sunnis in the region vastly outnumber them, providing a seemingly endless pool of fighters capable of sustaining the conflict for the foreseeable future. While Russian and Iranian backing will bolster Assad for now, a viable peace deal cannot emerge under the current status quo. Decisive intervention from the international community might help quell the violence, but uncertainties surrounding the political landscape in the aftermath hinder such efforts, limiting assistance to targeted groups. The opposition stands at a crossroads, struggling to unite due to sectarian strife, ideological differences, and internal power struggles. Initially, it was the protestors who fueled the movement, but as their actions turned more violent, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) began to take shape. This group was formed by military officers who defected from the regime, declaring on July 29, 2011, that they had a moral obligation to protect unarmed protestors. Leveraging their military backgrounds, they successfully persuaded many others to abandon their posts and join the opposition, bringing essential tactical experience and credibility to the resistance. Colonel Riad al-Asaad was appointed the head of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and continued to target government forces suppressing protests while garnering support from both regional and international communities. He has repeatedly emphasized that the FSA's primary goal is to dismantle Bashar Assad's regime, rather than impose any pre-existing political framework. To address concerns about sectarian conflict, he highlighted the involvement of numerous Alawites in the resistance and the popular backing of over 15,000 army defectors. The FSA has taken the lead in the resistance, welcoming individuals from diverse religious, social, and political backgrounds. However, significant opposition has emerged within the FSA due to escalating power struggles. On March 24, 2012, the FSA merged with the "Higher Military Council" to form a unified armed resistance aimed at streamlining command structures and coordinating operations, despite their previous differences. Yet, in December 2012, this combined group underwent a reorganization that altered the FSA's composition to attract greater international support. While the non-ideological Brigadier General Salim Idris was appointed Chief of Staff of the FSA, his deputies are openly aligned with Islamist ideologies. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood from the diaspora now comprise over two-thirds of the reorganized Free Syrian Army (FSA) council, establishing a significant power base within the resistance despite largely remaining on the sidelines during the initial fighting. Meanwhile, Ahrar al-Sham and the Al-Nusra Front, two hardline groups linked to al-Qaeda, were excluded from the FSA. However, their cadre of insurgents, seasoned by conflicts around the globe, suggests they will continue to wield influence. Some analysts argue that the FSA's official rejection of these groups was a strategic move to address Western concerns and facilitate foreign intervention. Yet, many factions within the FSA reportedly continue to coordinate their actions and objectives with Ahrar al-Sham and Al-Nusra. Concerns have been voiced among members of the Syrian resistance regarding the rising power of the Al-Nusra Front and their ambitions to impose strict Islamic rule in Syria. This has led to troubling questions about whether the aftermath of the civil war could be more detrimental than the dictatorship of Assad. The ongoing sectarian violence and attacks on neutral groups highlight the challenges that lie ahead in shaping a post-civil war landscape. It remains uncertain whether the Muslim Brotherhood can rebuild its following to the levels seen during their exile. According to the Carnegie Institute, the Syrian MB engaged in secret negotiations with the Syrian government in 1996, led by Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni. Although several hundred MB prisoners were released as a result, Assad refused to lift the ban on the movement or permit exiled MB members to return to Syria. The negotiations had a notable impact on the Muslim Brotherhood's efforts to rebuild a power base in Syria. A brief period of political freedom allowed them to forge relationships with other opposition groups, culminating in the announcement of the National Honor Pact in 2001. By 2005, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was one of many parties spanning a wide ideological spectrum—including left-wing radicals—united in their demand for a transition to democracy. However, the Brotherhood eventually distanced itself from its temporary allies to join the National Salvation Front, which sparked an Islamist-based opposition movement; they would later separate from this coalition as well. Writer and Middle East analyst Jamal Kashoggi asserts that for the Brotherhood in Syria to gain power, it must integrate a younger generation into its leadership and mend the significant rifts that have emerged between the diaspora and those still in the country, as well as the divisions between members from Aleppo and Damascus. The Syrian MB diaspora, many of whom have become relatively prosperous, initially refrained from participating in the rebellion against the government, which frustrated younger ikhwan members who fought and sacrificed. The Brotherhood did not officially declare support for the regime's removal until April 2012, leading to perceptions that they were waiting for a significant shift in the balance of power. Furthermore, the Egyptian Brotherhood has shown limited direct involvement beyond in-country protests and broad declarations, which has alienated Syrian members from their Egyptian leadership. The Jordanian MB, including Syrian leaders in the diaspora, has faced strong criticism for failing to develop a cohesive plan to address key issues in the civil war, such as the refugee crisis. Instead, they have focused on international conspiracies and the political landscape of various organizations in a post-civil war Syria. Despite their remarkable success in securing two-thirds of the seats in the new Free Syrian Army council, their influence is currently under attack from both within and outside Syria. Recent reports from the Syrian National Coalition indicate that Saudi and UAE efforts to incorporate new members into the coalition—aimed at diluting the Brotherhood's influence—are significantly undermining cohesion among the opposition. As coalition member Samir Nashar notes, “Everyone wants to call the shots when the Geneva 2 negotiations start,” emphasizing that the conflict has devolved into a sectarian war intertwined with regional power struggles. The Brotherhood has worked hard to present a moderate image, appointing Mohammad Riad al-Shaqfeh and Mohammad Farouk Tayfour to garner international support and temper the more inflammatory rhetoric associated with the MB. Additionally, in March 2012, the Brotherhood introduced the “Covenant and Pact,” which outlined their vision for a post-civil war Syria. Echoing the Egyptian model, it called for democracy, modernity, and pluralism within a civil state, emphasizing equality for all citizens based on fundamental human rights. This vision for a moderately Islamic government mirrors Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s trajectory in Turkey, and the Syrian MB has cultivated ties with their northern neighbor to exert additional pressure on Assad while alleviating Western concerns.

Conclusion

The Syrian civil war continues to be a chaotic and evolving situation, with no clear resolution in sight unless there is decisive foreign intervention. It is possible that Assad will remain in power; however, lacking a legitimate mandate to govern, he may attempt to eliminate all resistance forces, leading to a prolonged period of violence and turmoil for years to come. On the other hand, recent gains in key areas have given the Syrian opposition forces a significant advantage in any future negotiations, raising the prospect of them taking control of the country. If the opposition succeeds, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood could leverage its political expertise and support from wealthy Gulf states to establish a level of political stability that other groups may struggle to achieve. While the Al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front is unlikely to garner widespread support across the country, their influence and experienced fighters will not relinquish their share of power easily. They may well rejoin forces with other insurgent groups in Iraq. Meanwhile, leftist factions, despite their current role in the opposition and positive interactions with Western nations, are unlikely to maintain long-term stability in power, as their historical track record suggests. Christian opposition member Bassam Ishaq acknowledges, “The street has lost faith in leftist politicians. After the repression of the 1980s, the leftists scattered. In contrast, the Brotherhood remained united and rebuilt while in exile, bolstered by donations from wealthy Syrians and support from the Gulf.” In this context, the Syrian Brotherhood has cultivated a legacy of mistrust in a nation where over thirty percent of the population consists of minorities. More radical young Syrians have gravitated toward Salafi or Al-Qaeda-linked factions, while moderate Sunnis involved in business have voiced concerns that the Brotherhood would consolidate its power at the expense of freedom. They point to the recent example of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which, after coming to power, has faced a downward economic spiral alongside what both liberal and Salafi figures describe as a gradual erosion of core freedoms and political power struggles. The Syrian branch must grapple with the Egyptian model, which looms large in the minds of potential voters. They are at a disadvantage due to their thirty-year diaspora and the perception that they are disconnected from the realities on the ground. Their initial reluctance to engage in the fighting, coupled with a comparative lack of sacrifice compared to other rebel groups, will hinder the movement in significant ways. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood does enjoy support from within the region, bolstered by the financial backing of wealthy benefactors. Alongside their extensive network of politically astute members and connections to the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Syrian MB possesses advantages that enable them to wield significant influence, as demonstrated by their securing two-thirds of the seats on the National Council. However, they are likely to be cautious of the Egyptian model and may choose to stay clear of top government positions during the tumultuous post-civil war period. This strategy would allow them to let the situation stabilize while rebuilding their base of support, leaving other leaders to face the inevitable criticism that comes with reconstructing a severely damaged country. The Muslim Brotherhood, known for its long-term vision in power dynamics, would be wise to delay consolidating their power until conditions are more favorable for their leadership style.